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Abstract
It is argued that an evolutionary perspective on firm boundaries with its strong focus
on knowledge, as well as processes of search, learning and capability development is
instrumental in developing a theory of firm boundaries that is close to managerial
concerns. Building on insights in evolutionary economics, propositions are developed
regarding scope, speed, and switching costs in the process of vertical dis-integration
of which outsourcing is a particular instance. Current theories of firm boundaries
give indication why certain activities might be candidates for outsourcing by stressing
efficiency gains in terms of transaction and production costs.  They overlook,
however, that ‘technologically separable interface’ between activities might be not
available in codified form, and neglect learning dynamics that lead to strategic
consequences in terms of capability development and adaptability in competitive
environments of varying dynamics. An evolutionary perspective on vertical dis-
integration recognises that firms make contractual commitments and partly tacit
capabilities develop in a path dependent manner. The fact that the firm’s past casts a
shadow on current governance options and possibilities to realise them complicates
the process of governance change and imposes switching costs that impact the scope
and speed of vertical dis-integration. An evolutionary perspective on vertical dis-
integration also suggests considering long-term consequences of outsourcing
decisions on the dynamic capabilities of the firm.
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11. Introduction
In the development and diffusion of innovative technology, the needs of users
influence the evolution of knowledge production. Similarly, the users of theory
influence the evolution of knowledge production in theoretical advance. Traditionally,
research in the economic theory of the firm has focused on one main user group: other
economists interested in the theory of the firm. Yet, as organisational economist
increasingly migrate to business schools, they may also become (once again)1 more
exposed and aware of other users’ needs, namely, managers in charge of managing
the process of governance change (who happen to decide when and how to adapt the
scope of a firm’s activities). This paper is concerned with the process, context and
strategic impact of vertical dis-integration – letting suppliers take over activities
previously performed in-house2. It develops propositions regarding scope, speed, and
switching costs in the process of vertical dis-integration based on evolutionary
economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi and Marengo, 1994).
Consider that the worldwide value of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has
reached an impressive volume of $3.5 trillion in 2000. At the same time companies
have to an unprecedented degree vertically dis-aggregated, and refocused their
activities. The worldwide outsourcing market size is estimated to rise from US$ 21.3
billion in 1997 to US$ 59.6 billion by 2005, with an annual growth rate of 14%.
(Gartner Group, 2000; Holmström and Roberts, 1998; ZengerandHesterly, 1997).
Clearly, choosing and changing the boundaries of the firm is of great strategic
concern. Current economic theories addressing the vertical boundaries of the firm
(e.g. transaction cost economics, resource-based view) provide indications why
certain activities might be candidates for outsourcing by stressing efficiency gains in
terms of transaction and production costs. Unfortunately, to know what activities
might be outsourced and why is a far cry from knowing what processes are required
for implementing efficiency gains both in the short and also in the long run?
                                                          
1 It is interesting to note that the patron saint of the theory of the firm, Ronald Coase, suggests that
attention should be directed to ‘what managers do’ (1988).
2  Note that this paper is concerned with ‘outsourcing as a process of vertical dis-integration were
external suppliers take over value chain activities (be they primary or support activities) previously
performed inhouse’. Other authors misleadingly, use outsourcing to denote ‘external procurement of
activities’ that were never performed in-house (e.g. the typical make of buy decision).
2This paper argues that an evolutionary perspective on firm boundaries with its
strong focus on knowledge, as well as processes of search, learning and capability
development is particularly useful for developing a theory of firm boundaries that is
close to managerial concerns. Building on insights in evolutionary economics,
propositions are developed regarding scope, speed, and switching costs in the process
of vertical dis-integration of which outsourcing is a particular instance. Current
economic theories of firm boundaries are briefly reviewed and found remiss in respect
the process aspects and long-term consequences of vertical dis-integration (2.
Outsourcing: A brief review). Next, an evolutionary perspective on vertical dis-
integration is introduced (3. Evolutionary theory and vertical dis-integration).  It
recognises that firms make contractual commitments and partly tacit capabilities
develop in a path dependent manner. The fact that the firm’s past casts a shadow on
current governance options and the possibilities of realising them, complicates the
process of governance change by imposing switching costs that impact the scope and
speed of vertical dis-integration. Importantly, search processes involving articulation
and codification of partly tacit interfaces among capabilities are made explicit (3.1.
Switching costs during governance change). An evolutionary perspective on vertical
dis-integration considers that outsourcing processes take place in a particular
competitive context where changes in this context and learning responses to those
changes are seen as key drivers of long term changes in the distribution of capability
maintenance and development among firms (3.2. Competitive dynamics and vertical
dis-integration).  Finally, an evolutionary perspective on vertical dis-integration
suggests considering long-term consequences of outsourcing processes on the
dynamic capabilities of the firm  - the ability of firms to integrate, build and re-
configure internal and external competencies to address changing contexts (4. Vertical
dis-integration and dynamic capabilities).  Implications for advancing the theory of
the firm follow (5. Conclusions).
32. Outsourcing: A brief review
Managers are increasingly challenged to navigate in a ‘new competitive landscape’
(Bettis and Hitt, 1995) characterised by decreasing transaction costs due to
technological advance in, and standardization of communication technology (Coombs
and Metcalfe, 2000), a need to integrate increasingly diverse technology and
knowledge domains per product offering (Pavitt, 1999), and intensified competition
due to deregulation and rapid technological change and diffusion (Clark and
Wheelwright, 1993; D'Aveni, 1994). At a governance level, firms have responded to
these challenges with an increasing degree of corporate dis-aggregation accompanied
by relational forms of outsourcing (Day and Wendler, 1999; Hamel and Prahalad,
1994; Zenger and Hesterly, 1997). For example, because information can be shared
instantly and inexpensively among many people in many locations, the value of
centralized decision making and expensive bureaucracies decreases.
More generally, outsourcing may be regarded as an organizational response to
knowledge-based competition: A need to compete based on focussed and integrative
learning, accessing external specialized knowledge, and developing relational
advantages through inter-firm cooperation. Outsourcing is not a new phenomenon,
however. Smith (1976) argued long ago that the division of labour enhances focussed
skill development, and also influences the growth of differentiated knowledge
production to fuel economic development (Foss, 1997; Loasby, 2001).
While the question, why firms should outsource certain activities is an
increasingly relevant question for business practitioners it is also a central question in
the perhaps dominating theories of the firm: Modern transaction cost economics and
the resource based view (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996; Peteraf, 1993, Wernerfeld,
1984, Prahalad and Conner, 1996). How do these theories of firm boundaries help
those in charge of managing governance change to decide when to outsource and to
steer their firms through the process of shifting activities from internal to external
procurement?
42.1 TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AND VERTICAL DIS-INTEGRATION
Over the last 25 years, modern transaction cost theory has emerged as the most often
used theory of vertical boundary choice.  It is premised on the idea that high levels of
three transaction attributes – uncertainty, frequency, and especially asset specificity –
are positively related to internal procurement of activities.3 TCE suggests that
outsourcing entails transaction costs including searching, contracting, controlling, and
recontracting and that supplier markets do entail some risks for buyers with respect to
price, quality, and time. Thus, one can suggest that activities are good candidates for
external procurement where such costs will be low. Transaction cost economics
(Williamson, 1979; 1985; 1996) speak to the question what variables influence
outsourcing decisions by concentrating on required incentives to make asset-specific
investments in support of a given transaction (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978).
Placing the ownership of the assets in a given transaction into the hands of a single
party improves the incentives for making efficient transaction-specific investments
when contracts are incomplete and the cost associated with a hold-up is significant
(Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995). Investment incentives may be diluted when
parties to a transaction are exposed to hold up risk in contractual relations. Such risk
may be attenuated, however, either by the acquisition of residual rights to asset usage
(Hart, 1995) or, more generally, by hierarchical governance to make provision for
flexible adaptation in incomplete contracts (Williamson, 1991).
 In sum, transaction cost economics seems to suggest that managers may
consider a shift from internal to external procurement if production costs reductions
can be obtained through outsourcing and hold up risks are low (Williamson, 1975,
1985, 1996). This will be the case if activities (1) do not require investments in
specific assets that invite hold up, (2) are not subject to a high degree of
environmental uncertainty, and (3) are those on which the firm relies infrequently
(Aubert et al, 1996). This would imply that companies outsource commodity services
(e.g. catering, cleaning) that involve low degrees of asset specificity.  Yet, companies
increasingly outsource activities (logistics, HR functions, professional services) that
are frequently used, exhibit substantial uncertainty, and involve substantial degrees of
                                                          
3 There is mounting doubt that a high level of asset specificity and associated hold-up risks are a
sufficient condition to justify internal procurement (Coase, 1988, Walker & Poppo, 1991). Relational
governance and reputation-based mechanisms may substitute for hierarchical governance at lower
costs (Holmström & Roberts, 1998).
5asset specific investments (PWC, 1998). On the other hand activities that exhibit low
asset specificity are kept in-house. Consider relative well standardised PC platforms
of companies consisting of hardware, operating system platform, local packages
perhaps interfacing with group ware tools, and backed up by corporate networks.
Each of these activities (e.g. software installations, mainframe maintenance and
update, networking operations) taken individually are commodity services with low
levels of asset specificity, but nonetheless many companies prefer to keep all services
in-house because selective outsourcing of individual services is prevented by
interdependencies among them.
TCE has been critisized because it blackboxes the historical context, the
interrelationship among transaction, as well as long term consequences of boundary
choices (Chandler, 1992, Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999; Langlois and Foss, 1999).
For example, Langlois and Foss, (1999) note that transaction costs economics is not
sensitive to the efficiency implication of capability maintenance and development.
Others argue that a better understanding of boundary decisions requires the
recognition that prior governance choices constrain current outsourcing decisions (e.g.
Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999). As Walker and Poppo (1991, p. 66) correctly note,
“... how the theory should be used as a predictor of shifts in the current boundaries of
the corporation is unclear (emphasis added).”
The fact that the firm’s past casts a shadow on current governance options and
possibilities to realise them complicates the process of governance change by
imposing switching costs that impact the scope and speed of vertical dis-integration.
An additional problem of TCE is that managers who shift “current boundaries” often
cannot assume “technologically separable interface” between activities, as
Williamson (1985: 1, chaper 3) seems to suggest.4 In sum then, not only does
transaction cost theory side-step process issues of governance change. It is also ill
equipped to provide sufficient guidance for managers that need to evaluate how
outsourcing – the process of shifting firm boundaries - influences the dynamic
capabilities of the firm.
                                                          
4 Transaction cost theory has been widely used and critisized (e.g. Dosi & Marengo, 2000). The
purpose here, however, is not to repeat problems others have discussed, but to emphasis the theories
lack of a process dimension.
62.2. THE RESOURCE BASED VIEW AND VERTICAL DIS-INTEGRATION
The resource-based view suggests that differential firm performance is related to
differences in a firm’s costs and strategic advantages obtained through building,
using, and defending resource positions (Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1984; Peteraf, 1994).
Factors, which influence how resource positions are build, used, and maintained
rather than structural industry features alone, determine how firms increase the wedge
between the willingness of customers to pay for product/service offerings and the
opportunity costs of production and supply (e.g. Wernerfelt, 1984; Rumelt, 1984). For
example, Barney (1991: 6) argues that competitive advantage and the earning of
‘above normal returns’ can be associated with resources that are “(a) valuable, in the
sense that it exploits opportunities and/or neutralizes threats in a firm’s environment;
(b) it must be rare among a firm’s current and potential competitors; (c) it must be
imperfectly imitable; and (d) there cannot be strategically equivalent substitutes for
this resource.” Building on this perspective, Quinn and Hilmer (1995) suggest that
firms concentrate on resources and capabilities where they can achieve pre-eminence
and provide unique value for customers, while simultaneously shift to external
procurement where a firm has neither a critical strategic need nor special capabilities.
One problem with this approach is that strategic capabilities and resources are
often hard to identify in practice so that at any particular moment in time, managers
face difficulties in judging whether they are dealing with resources and capabilities of
critical strategic need. For example, many IT based airline reservation/logistic
systems are today seen as crucial to an airline’s competitive advantage. But such
systems began as automation initiatives to save clerical costs, before they were seen
as optimisation systems in an airline’s logistic and flight schedule programming, to
later assume the additional function as platform for electronic distribution channels. In
this context, Earl (1996) argues that much of such IT capabilities is experimental, and
IT users learn about strategic importance of such capabilities only after they
experimentally discover what is possible and as the business context and needs
change. The IT outsourcing bandwagon is littered with examples were companies
though to outsource commodity services just to discover that they have compromised
their strategic capabilities only few years later.
                                                                                                                                                                     
7By implication, what resources and capabilities are judged as strategically
critical might have to do with top management’s imagination as much as with current
activity performance. As Penrose (1959) notes: “…the productive opportunity of a
firm must he shown to be limited in any period. It is clear that this opportunity will be
restricted to the extent to which a firm does not see opportunities for expansion, is
unwilling to act upon them, or is unable to respond to them” (pp. 31-32). Moreover,
exactly because strategically valuable capabilities are causally ambiguous and socially
complex (Rumelt and Lippman, 1982, Peteraf, 1993) they are often richly interrelated
with other complementary resources and capabilities that do not meet the criteria
outlined by Barney (1991).
Nonetheless, combining resource based and transaction cost reasoning, Quinn
and Hilmer (1995: 56) suggest to simultaneously consider the potential for
competitive advantage (resource based view) and the degree of strategic vulnerability
(transaction cost economics) to make decisions on whether to outsource a particular
activity. They recommend managers to answer the following questions: First, what is
the potential for obtaining competitive advantage in this activity, taking account of
transaction costs? Second, what is the potential vulnerability that could arise from
market failure if the activity is outsourced? Third, what can we do to alleviate our
vulnerability by structuring arrangements with suppliers to afford appropriate controls
yet provide for necessary flexibility in demand?”
While these are important questions that may contribute to guiding a firm’s
outsourcing decision, they do little to help managers understand switching costs
during the process of vertical dis-integration, fail to relate the process of outsourcing
to competitive dynamics, and downplay long term consequences on maintaining and
developing the dynamic capabilities of the firm. Moreover, both transaction cost
economics and the resource-based view make heroic assumptions about human
cognition and managerial discretion.5 But boundedly rational managers (Cyert and
March, 1963) who happen to decide on outsourcing and who have to manage the
process of governance change often do not have relevant information at hand to
answer the above questions. Instead they engage in experimental search and learning
while identifying and discovering possibilities to improve efficiency under conditions
of uncertainty and ignorance while changing the boundaries of the firm.
                                                          
5 The role of “bounded rationality” in TCE is restricted to only one of its implications: The inability
and/or costs of writing complete contracts. The role of bounded rationality in the RBV is restricted to
link one resource property (causal ambiguity) to difficulties of other firms for imitation.
83. An evolutionary perspective on vertical dis-aggregation
Unlike transaction cost theory and the resource based view, evolutionary theory (Dosi
and Marengo 1994, 2000; Kogut and Zander 1992, 1996; Nelson and Winter 1982;
Nelson 1991;  Teece, Pisano and Schuen 1998; Teece et al. 1994, Winter, 1988; 1982;
Foss, 1993) provides the kernel of a process theory of economic organisation.
Although, evolutionary theory has not focussed directly on the question of vertical
dis-integration, evolutionary theory yields important insights relevant to the process
of outsourcing. For example, Teece et al (1994) suggest that the boundaries of the
corporation can be understood in terms of learning, path dependencies, and the firm’s
relative competitive position in terms of capability maintenance, integration and
development.  In particular, evolutionary theorists assume three central elements of
evolutionary explanations:
(a) Boundedly rational actors are assumed (Cyert and March, 1963; Dosi and Egidi,
1993; Nelson and Winter, 1982);
(b) The central unit of analysis are search processes, problem solving procedures and
path dependent learning in organizations (Nelson and Winter, 1982, Winter,
2000),
(c) Sensitivity to the contextual embededness of organisational capability
maintenance and development is emphasised (Dosi and Marengo, 1994, Nelson
and Winter, 1982).
“Bounded rationality” means that human actors involved in complex problem solving
are limited in knowledge, skills and time (Cyert and March, 1963). By implication,
managers involved in changing the boundaries of the firm may not be expected to be
in a position of an omnipotent decision-maker facing well-defined governance
options. Decision parameters, might not be obvious to actors involved and search
efforts to discover them are constrained by existing capabilities and incentives. By
implication, changes in firm boundaries are likely to proceed along a sequence of
                                                                                                                                                                     
9process steps best thought of as experimental search and learning process to discover
possibilities for improvements in efficiency – both in the short and long run.6
‘Bounded rationality’ also implies a need for cognitive specialization.
Routinized co-ordination in collective problem solving is a response to this need
(Cyert and March, 1963; March and Levinthal, 1993). Nelson and Winter (1982,
chapter 4 and 5) picture the firm as a repository of unique routines. As Winter (1982)
points out, “[t]he coordination displayed in the performance of organizational
routines is, like that displayed in the exercise of individual skills, the fruit of
practice...the learning experience is a shared experience of organization members”
(Winter, 1982:76). Many routines are the results of past decisions and
experimentation (Grandori, 2001). Because adaptation of routines is slow, they
survive personal turnover (March and Simon, 1958) and give stability to organizations
and direction to their re-current activities (Cyert and March, 1963). Collectively,
routines present a firm’s capability - a collection of interdependent routines that
‘…confer upon an organization’s management a set of decision options for producing
significant output of a particular type’ (Winter, 2000: 983). Because interfaces
between routines develop via partly tacit, path-dependent learning by doing, they may
constrain governance change as causal relations and interfaces between them are often
based on tacit knowledge rather than explicit understanding (Nelson and Winter,
1982).
A focus on search and learning processes during vertical dis-integration as the
central unit of analysis (Nelson and Winter, 1982, Winter, 2000) suggests that
changing the boundaries of the firm is about the identification and discovery of
possibilities to improve incentives and to enhance, via learning in continued
interaction, the firm’s capacity for collective achievement (Nelson and Winter, 1982).
This process of vertical dis-integration (as other processes of system de-composition
too) is a learning process, involving conjecture, trial and error (Loasby, 1976; Simon,
1969). There are also costs in the process of governance change that depend on the
nature of linkages between system elements – for example linkages between the
routines and capabilities may vary in their degree of articulation and codification.
                                                          
6 Dosi & Coriat (1998) recently stated a need to more clearly address the linkages between capabilities
and incentives as two co-evolving and complementary sources of differential efficiency: “Steps [need
to be taken] towards an appreciation of the co-evolution of (incentive effects), on the one hand, and
‘what a firm is able to do and to discover on the other” (p. 105).
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Often interfaces between organizational routines are made explicit the first time when
organizations consider outsourcing.
Finally, the nature of learning processes during vertical dis-integration is
influenced ‘by particular characteristics of the environment’ to which the firm is
subjected (Loasby, 1976: 33). An evolutionary perspective emphasizes sensitivity to
the contextual embededness of organizational capability maintenance and
development (Dosi and Marengo, 1994; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1998): “The core
concern of evolutionary theory is with the dynamic process by which firm behaviour
patterns and market outcomes are jointly determined over time… (Nelson and Winter,
1982: 18). Thus there are external factors in the competitive environment of the firm
that limits or facilitates the potential scope for vertical dis-integration including the
extent of the market (Smith, 1776), the nature of innovation regimes (Chesborough
and Teece, 1996), all well as imitation dynamics (Nelson and Winter, 1982). An
evolutionary perspective on vertical dis-integration considers that outsourcing
processes take place in a particular competitive context that provides the opportunity
for vertical dis-integration. Changes in this context (e.g. growth, industry life cycles
etc.) and adaptive responses by the firm to those changes are seen as key drivers of
long term changes in the distribution of capability maintenance and development
among firms. In the following I develop propositions about the scope, speed, and
impact of vertical dis-integration based the applied principles of an evolutionary
explanation to the question of vertical dis-integration. In particular, I consider
switching costs during governance change in section (3.1), competitive dynamics and
vertical dis-integration in section (3.2) and finally, the impact of vertical dis-
integration on dynamic capabilities in section (3.3).
3.1. SWITCHING COSTS DURING GOVERNANCE CHANGE
Even if a company could reliably identify why certain activities should be outsourced,
an evolutionary perspective on governance change suggests that there are at least two
process complications that give cause to switching costs: Governance inseparability
and complementarity of capabilities.7 For example, during outsourcing services
former internal staff may go work for a potential vendor but how fast will they be
                                                          
7 Other limits to outsourcing may occur because markets are incomplete or non-existent (Dierickx and
Cool, 1989).
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integrated in the supplier system to provide services to their original company? Will
the outsourcer loose absorptive capacity to an extent so that he fails to be a
demanding customer and informed buyer? What will be the impact on the remaining
business activities that were prior to vertical integration serviced in house? If
interfaces between activities are not specified, how much parallel effort will it take to
train specialists from vendors? What disruptions should one expect and how long will
they last?
The switching costs associated with these problems are neglected in
conventional theories of the firm, but they become obvious in an evolutionary process
perspective. They can be exemplified, by processes of knowledge codification in the
specification of interfaces, loss of absorptive capacity, and complications associated
with integrating capabilities in the suppliers system. Only a part of such switching
costs are foreseeable ex-ante (e.g. those that rest on enforceable punishment of breach
of commitments). But to a large extent, switching costs (e.g. those that are due to
separating jointly developed capabilities) can be only discovered during the process of
governance change.
- Codification of interfaces
- Loss of absorptive capacity
- Re-integration costs
- etc...
Scope of outsourcing
Governance inseparability Complementarity of capabilities
Switching costs
- Breaking commitments
- Tacit & explicit
Figure 1: Governance change and switching costs
3.1.1.   Governance inseparability
Argyres and Liebeskind (1999, 2000) recently suggested that prior contractual
commitments made by a firm may limit its ability to differentiate or change its
governance arrangements in the future. Rather than focussing on the characteristics of
isolated transactions as in Williamson (1996) they argue that “…governance of any
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new transaction in which a firm engages may become linked inseparably with the
governance of other transactions in which the firm is already engaged.” In essence,
the authors assert that there are exit barriers on a governance level because a firm’s
past governance choices significantly influence the range and types of governance
mechanisms that it can adopt in future periods. But the authors also introduce a
crucial methodological point that bears resemblance to evolutionary reasoning
(Argyres and Liebeskind, 2000: 238) since they point out that: “…focus on the
transaction as the unit of analysis can obscure interdependencies between
transactions.”
To focus governance choice on individual transaction attributes may lead to
inefficient choices because this overlooks possible impact on related transactions. In
sum, firms cannot exist without making commitments (Kreps, 1990), but prior
commitment presents limits to outsourcing. As a consequence, even when asset
specific investments are not required for the efficient conduct of an activity,
outsourcing options might be impeded by prior contractual commitments.  Examples
of related prior commitments include exclusive supplier or distributor arrangements,
but also long-term employment contracts. Prior legal and psychological commitments
with employees are an especially important factor influencing governance change. If a
firm wishes to reduce employment levels during outsourcing, it might have to bear
severance payments to laid off employees, suffer from declining reputation as a good
employer, and/or deal with reduced morale among remaining employees (Matusik and
Hill, 1998; Kreps, 1990). Thus, an evolutionary perspective on vertical dis-integration
suggests the following refutable proposition:
P1: The scope of outsourcing will be lower with increasingly constrained labour
markets and higher degrees of unionisation
3.1.2. Complementary capabilities
Complementarity of capabilities is the technical corollary of governance
inseparability. It is an essential insight in the evolutionary literature that capabilities
develop in a context-dependent and path-dependent matter (e.g. Nelson and Winter,
1982; Dosi and Marengo, 1994). Interactive learning steps taken in capability
development involve tacit dimensions and causal ambiguity (Polanyi, 1966; Lippman
and Rumel, 1982). Levitt and March (1988) suggest that learning of routines is often
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local and interpretation of experience is difficult either because generalization are
drawn from small samples in complex and changing environments or reflection is
temporarily separated from action (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Capabilities are the
harder to separate from each other the more linkages between them are based on
experience based learning. Articulating such interfaces and combining capabilities
within and between organizations is far from easy. Moreover, capabilities may not
remain valuable to full extent detached from their context – the nexus of routines in
which they have evolved and in which they are conducted.
Recent work in both organizational economics (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts
1990; 1995; Holmström and Milgrom 1991), the firm strategy literature (Dierickx and
Cool 1989; Porter 1996) and the HRM literature (Becker and Gerhart 1996; Baron
and Kreps 1999) has embraced this evolutionary insight to stress that activity systems
are most effective when complementarities are manifest between their constituent
elements. These interaction effects are the result of interactive, co-specialized, and
partly tacit learning of members involved in capability maintenance and development.
Complementarity obtains between two activities (say IT support and airline
logistics) when investing in one of these raises the return from investing in the other
one and vice versa (Milgrom and Roberts, 1991). Such interaction effects between
activities, lead to efficiency in executing capabilities. But this very effect also induces
inertia (Rumelt, 1995) that impedes changes in complementary activity systems.
Thus, the flip-side of this coin is that complementary activity systems can constrain
outsourcing possibilities of particular activities. Because lost interaction effects and
knowledge-spillovers between activities diminish the effectiveness of the remaining
activity system, firms that outsource particular activities (be they core or not) may
suffer something akin to ‘phantom limb pains’ well known from medical cases. At
times, capabilities cannot be separated nor contracted out without compromising
complementarity in existing activity systems.  Thus, an evolutionary perspective on
vertical dis-integration suggests:
P2: The scope of outsourcing will be lower the more capabilities are based on
experience-based knowledge
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In sum, switching costs obtain when there are costs to breaking prior commitment and
separating capabilities through interfaces that are tacit, causal ambiguous, socially
complex or taken for granted.
3.1.3. Specifying interfaces, knowledge articulation, and codification
Before outsourcing of activities becomes possible, explicit specifications of interfaces
among routines and activities must be created to facilitate efficient contracting and
coordination of activities. Domberger (1998: 40) agrees, when he argues “a successful
transition from vertical integration to market contracting cannot take place without
and explicit specification of inputs or outputs. When such a change in mode of supply
takes place specifications are typically revised, enhanced, or sometimes even
compiled for the very first time.” Specifications maybe either qualitative-narrative, or
quantitative or contain a mix of both qualitative and quantitative data (Nellore and
Söderquist, 2000). Additionally, in the specification of interfaces among activity
systems, there are also several degrees of comprehensiveness that vary with positively
with the uniqueness and complexity of activities at hand. Possibilities range from
scarce specifications of requirements to rich description of procedures and context
information.
A lack of explicit ex-ante specification often leads to costly delays in the
process of vertical dis-integration. Bartelemy (2001) finds in a study of outsourcing
that companies often cannot quantify such switching costs, but often take the time that
internal employees spend helping and teaching vendors as well as disruptions that
stem from a vendor’s inability to react appropriately as a proxy. Grover et al (1996)
argues that some interfaces of IT functions (e.g. data centers and network
management) are increasingly standardized. Others by contrast are signified by much
lower degrees of standardization (e.g. application engineering). Moreover, even if
interfaces are specified to some degree, they may require complementary tacit
knowledge. For example, when Air Canada outsourced its IT-logistic system to IBM,
the systems operation broke down for 5 days and remained interrupted for another 3
month, causing substantial losses despite substantial up-front planning.
If interface specification requires additional articulation and codification of
interfaces, one of the key concerns in the process of interface specification is to make
decisions regarding what knowledge to articulate, to codify, and to which extent
knowledge should be codified at which costs (Liebeskind, 1997). Approvingly,
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Nelson and Winter (1982: 82) argue: “…it should be emphasised that cost matter.
Whether a particular bit of knowledge is in principle articulable or necessarily tacit is
not the relevant question in most behavioural situations. Rather, the question is
whether the costs associated with the obstacles to articulation are sufficiently high so
that the knowledge in fact remains tacit.”  Thus it is important to note that that
specification processes are often riddled by imperfection, that they are time
consuming, and costly.
Cowen and Foray (1997:595) describe codification of knowledge as a
production process that includes “model building, language creation and the writing
of messages.” These sub-processes are performed in practice through brainstorming
sessions, discussions in teams, writing down memos, and exchange of thoughts to
generate interface specifications. If articulation, codifying and making explicit
interfaces between activity systems (e.g. logistics and other airline operation) impose
costly delays during governance change, it is useful to distinguish two categories of
associated costs: direct production costs and residual losses. While the former
captures managerial time spent to seek and describe knowledge, detach it from initial
use or users, and to embody it in some adequate form to make it accessible and useful
for the specification of interfaces among activities, the later concerns losses that occur
because tacit knowledge can only be imperfectly codified into explicit knowledge.
Direct costs in the process of knowledge-codification are influenced by several
cost-drivers. First, codification costs are the higher, the less the production process is
codified ex ante. Second, the thicker and detailed the required descriptions of activity
interfaces are (e.g. contextual features are added to a codified process description), the
more time will be used and the higher the efforts of codification. Finally, the more
activities are interconnected with other activities, the less partial codification is self-
contained and sufficiently useful in isolation (Winter, 1987).
Residual losses occur because the richness and nuances of tacit knowledge are
partially lost in the process of codification. Since tacit knowledge can not be
completely converted into explicit knowledge, attempts to codification involve
simultaneously an element of reduction – that is, abstracting away nuances and details
required for knowledge-based performances. For example, MacKenzie and Spinardi
(1995) showed in the case of nuclear weapon production that, despite substantial
efforts of codification, tacit knowledge could not be codified to full extent. Likewise,
Polanyi (1966) has earlier argued that tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge are
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complements rather than substitutes. While explicit and codified knowledge is
instrumental to develop tacit knowledge (e.g. a cook book aids cooking, but does not
contain the ability to cook of the one who wrote it), tacit knowledge can be at best
imperfectly described and encoded. It is thus that attempts to codify knowledge in the
specification of interfaces are the more limited the more complex such interfaces are.
Thus, an evolutionary perspective on vertical dis-integration suggests:
P3: The speed of the outsourcing process will be slower, the less interfaces
between activities are specified ex-ante, and the more complex outsourced
activities are.
While articulation and codification processes have been regarded as essential for
learning in organization (e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982, Mahnke, 1998, Zollo and
Winter, 2001), the speed of the process of vertical integration is additionally
influenced by two factors: The relative absorptive capacity (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998)
and motivation of participants involved in the process. To illustrate, it is helpful to
describe knowledge codification as a production process through which prior tacit
knowledge is transformed into codified artefacts, such as interfaces among activities:
 Tacit Knowledge Not Tacit Knowledge
Articulated KnowledgeNot Articulated Knowledge
Expressed KnowledgeNot Expressed Knowledge
(A)
(B)
(Explicit Knowledge)
(C)
Codified Knowledge
Figure 2: Knowledge codification as production process (Similar: Winter, 1987)
While Polanyi’s (1966) distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge is
integral to the more fine-grained distinctions made here (see also Winter, 1987), it is
interesting to ask why some knowledge is not expressed to others?  For knowledge to
be codified it must be previously expressed. Calling for a realistic model of ‘man’,
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Stein and Ridderstråle (1996) rightfully assert that individuals may not only know
more than they can tell, they may also tell less than they know, and at times tell more
than they know. Moreover, individuals may not articulate what they could articulate,
and may not express to others what they articulate to themselves. For example, why
should manager formulate particular knowledge about interfaces between activities, at
least to himself, when there are obvious personal costs to do so while personal
benefits are absent or hard to identify? When knowledge is articulated, at least in the
mind of one person (e.g. conscious reason, internal speech), there arises the question
whether it should be expressed to others and why this should be done? People may
hideaway knowledge strategically to create dependencies (Pfeffer, 1982). They may
hoard knowledge for later harvesting (Stein and Ridderstråle, 1996), or gain
advantages in contractual exchange (Akerlof, 1970). Moreover, they may seek to
avoid loss of face value by ‘biting tongues’ or ‘swallowing pride’ (Harre and
DeCarlo, 1985), or circumvent political hazards or conflict in situations where people
may know more than is legitimate to express (Goldhaber, 1993).
When one decides to keep knowledge to oneself, knowledge remains entirely
personal, unexpressed and not displayed. When one decides to express knowledge to
others, there is still no guarantee that those who receive this expression understand
properly. This requires prior shared knowledge from which understanding and fast
learning can proceed (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). In sum, there are many reasons
why people can know more than they tell and others understand, including a general
impossibility to articulate, a cost/benefits analysis with negative results, a hoarding of
articulated knowledge for strategic reasons, an inability of receivers to understand due
to lacking shared codes (Kogut and Zander, 1992). To further complicate the picture,
while there are many reasons why people know more than they can tell, want to tell,
or are able to communicate, they may at times not only tell less than they could, they
may also tell more (cf. Stein and Ridderstråle, 1996). For example, when they
opportunistically distort and manipulate signals expressed to others (e.g. Williamson,
1996).
One reason for outsourcing is that external specialist are likely to be better
specialists (Domberger, 1998). But no matter how good they are, they need to be able
to communicate with internal staff and this depends on the motivation and ability of
both parties involved in the process. If an activity has been badly managed internally
due to a lack of specialist knowledge, will managers be any better at communicating
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their need to external providers? Earl (1996) suggests that very often, a company
needs to hire better specialists to ensure effective communication and also turn around
internal performance before subcontracting to the marketplace: “In other words, to
reduce initial risks in outsourcing, a company must be capable of managing … service
first. Vendors may pull out at the first stage when they learn how weak the customer’s
… management is; they recognize that weak management is not an opportunity for
profit taking but a recipe for conflict and dissatisfaction…[Additionally] if there are
changes in the vendor’s personnel or organization, the company has to invest in
building new partnerships and understanding how things are done in the new regime”
(p.27).
 Some authors (e.g. Rebitzer and Taylor, 1991) argue that outsourcing is
initiated to transform a resistant work force and slack activities in the organisation.
However, when people fear to loose their job through outsourcing, how will this
influence their motivation to make the process of vertical dis-integration work
smoothly? Some employees may be kept in-house or be transferred to the external
vendor to ensure some continuity of service. But the most capable employees with
outside options in the labour markets will demand substantial mark-ups to stay with
the prior company rather than seek opportunities elsewhere. In any case, motivating
such employees to express and codify their knowledge will cost the outsourcer dearly
be it in the form of higher vendor fees or internal motivation costs. Moreover, the
departure of individuals will in any case compromise routines in which they are
involved (Nelson, 1991; Simon, 1991). Thus one can suggest:
P4: The outsourcing process will slower and more costly, the less participants are
capable and willing to articulate and share their knowledge with external
vendors
In sum, the scope of activities that a firm can outsource at any point in time depends
on prior contractual commitments and the consequences of breaking them, required
articulation and codification of interface specification between activities that are
intended to be transferred from internal to external procurement, as well as the
capabilities and motivation of participants in the process of vertical dis-integration.
Additionally, however, an evolutionary perspective on the process of vertical dis-
integration considers that outsourcing processes take place in a particular competitive
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context. As Langlois and Robertson (1995: 45) note, ”…options for change at any
given point are constrained by the nature of the environment at this point…dis-
integration…depends on the existing distribution of capabilities.”
3.2.   VERTICAL DIS-INTEGRATION AND COMPETITIVE DYNAMCIS
Firms are not isolated entities; they are embedded in exchange and production
relations (Granovetter, 1985). As a consequence, a firm’s effort to maintain and
develop capabilities is embedded in an external environment, which may be signified
by either the industry in which it is active, the technology it applies or develops, or
alternatively the wider institutional environment in which it is embedded. Thus there
might be external factors in the competitive environment of the firm that limits or
facilitates varying degrees of vertical dis-integration including the extent of the
market (Smith, 1776; Stigler, 1951), the nature of innovation regimes (Chesborough
and Teece, 1996), all well as imitation dynamics (Nelson and Winter, 1982).
3.2.1.   The extent of the market
A first indication about the market context / vertical dis-integration relation can be
derived from Adam Smith’s (1776) argument that ‘the division of labour is limited by
the extent of the market’. For example, Young (1928) suggests that if firms in an
industry are initially vertically integrated, an increasing division of labour becomes
possible when output demand is large enough to support economies of scale in
specialized production of intermediate products. Similar, Stigler (1951: 189) argues
“that Smith’s theorem suggests that vertical dis-integration is the typical development
in growing industries, vertical integration in declining industries.” In essence his
argument rests on the assumption that the growth of a firm is constraint because it
performs increasing and decreasing return activities simultaneously. It is only when
the market for final output increases to sufficient degrees that increasing return
activities may be beneficially vertically dis-integrated. However, while the extent of
the output market may provide possibilities of specialization through vertical dis-
integration, it is the distribution of capabilities in the competitive context of a firm
that determines whether firms make use of possibilities of vertical dis-integration.
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Schumpeter (1950) describes competitiveness of firms as the ability to carry out
a range of competitive actions that are based on internally developed and externally
accessed capabilities.8 Whether or not capabilities can be successfully deployed
depends, however, on how easy they can be imitated, protected, challenged by
competitors, or, alternatively supported by complementors. In other words, they
depend on the capability configuration of the competitive and institutional
environment in which the focal firm operates; to which it responds; which it may try
to shape, and on which it draws. Thus one can suggest:
P5: The greater the extent of the output-market the greater possibilities for vertical
dis-integration of intermediate products; but the greater the competitive risk of
knowledge imitation associated with outsourcing the less will firms outsource
intermediate products.
3.2.2.  Imitation dynamics
Firms engaged in outsourcing face a critical tension: successful outsourcing often
requires putting valuable knowledge assets at risk. While vertical dis-integration may
help companies to access capabilities that they cannot build in a reasonable time
frame themselves outsourcing also gives vendors a window to valuable knowledge
that they may leak to other clients including competitors. Despite valuable knowledge
that leaks to competitors may be often hard to exactly imitate, leaking knowledge may
also lead to innovative substitution that are based on a combination of leaked
knowledge and complementary knowledge that is already in possession of
competitors (Schumpeter, 1950). A particularly important aspect with respect to
assess the risk of knowledge leakage is to what degree and how fast a firm’s
knowledge becomes outdated and obsolete through learning by others? By
implication, whether or not increasing degrees of vertical dis-integration are
associated with increasing imitation risk depends, inter alia, on the technology
development path that characterises the environment in which the firm is embedded.
One way to describe technological dynamics, is to distinguish between
technologies signified by (a) knowledge accumulation or (b) creative destruction (e.g.
                                                          
8 Such activities are performed based on the firm’s current capability configuration and may include the
generation of certain product qualities at particular cost levels, absorbing knowledge or integrating
technologies, cooperating and exchanging knowledge with suppliers, reacting to competitive moves
or launching innovative products.
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Nelson and Winter, 1982; Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Malerba and Orsiengo,
1994). Building on Nelson and Winter’s (1982) notion of ‘technological regimes’,
Malerba and Orsiengo (1994) offer two specific patterns of technology
development: Schumpeter I and Schumpeter II.9
Schumpeter-(I)-patterns of technology development are characterised by
‘creative destruction’ in the sense that technological advance rapidly substitutes for
old technology. As the authors note: “New entrepreneurs enter an industry with new
ideas and innovations, launch new enterprises which challenge established firms, and
continuously disrupt the current ways of production, organization and distribution,
thus wiping out the quasi rents associated with previous technological advantages”
(Malerba and Orsiengo, 1994: 85). By implication, Schumpeter-(I) patterns of
environmental dynamics stress the need to constantly access new technologies and
constantly upgrade capabilities, while risk concerns regarding knowledge leakage
might be of less relevance due to rapid obsolescence of capabilities. In other words: A
more dynamic environment (e.g. creative destruction) de-emphasise competitive risks
related to rapid imitation dynamics but instead stresses access to external knowledge
and learning speed.
By contrast, Schumpeter-(II)- technologies are characterised by knowledge-
accumulation in the sense that technological advance builds on and gradually
complements existing technology. In such contexts, private firm knowledge is far less
exposed to rapid obsolescence by technological advance made by other firms.
Simultaneously, however, protection against knowledge leakage becomes relatively
more important because competitors are more likely to command requisite absorptive
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) that makes imitation a viable competitive
threat. Thus, an evolutionary perspective on vertical dis-integration yields the
following refutable proposition:
P6: The degree of vertical dis-integration will be lower in firms operating in
Schumpeter-(II) technological regimes than in firms operating in Schumpeter-
(I) technological regimes.
                                                          
9 For a possible operationalization of technological regimes see Malerba & Orsiengo, (1994).
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3.2.3 Innovation regime
With regard to Schumpeter (I) environments, Chesbrough and Teece (1996) suggest
that degrees of vertical dis-integration might be additionally influenced by the nature
of technological innovation in question. Increasingly diverse technology and
knowledge domains per product offering (Pavitt, 1999) may lead to failure in
companies to continue developing all technologies internally that they require for
innovative product offering. But outsourcing innovative activities can be complicated
to the extent that one innovative activity depends on simultaneous development of
another. While autonomous innovation can be pursued independently from other
innovations, the benefits of systemic innovation can be realized only in conjunction
with related, complementary innovations. If innovation are of the systemic type in the
sense that simultaneous innovation in a related technology are required, then
coordinated adjustment and information flows between development efforts are
required because R&D managers must absorb each others research findings and
follow product experiments. If this is the case, on can propose that
P6: Degrees of vertical dis-integration among innovating firms will be lower the
more they are engaged in systemic innovations
In sum then, as a consequence of the arguments presented above this paper has argued
based on principles of evolutionary explanations that the scope of vertical dis-
integration will be lower if firms operate (a) in constrained labour markets; (b) in
Schumpeter-(II) technological regimes; (c) with higher degrees of unionisation; and
(d) when they are engaged in the development of systemic innovations. Furthermore,
the process of vertical dis-integration will be slower and more costly, the (e) more
capabilities are based on experience-based knowledge; (f) the less interfaces between
activities are specified ex-ante, the more complex outsourced activities are, and (g)
the less participants involved in the process of governance change are capable and
willing to articulate and share their knowledge with external vendors.
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4. Vertical dis-aggregation and dynamic capabilities
Much of the current literature on outsourcing stresses the short-term impact of
outsourcing on procurement costs as well as flexibility to reduce and expand
productive capacity to address changing patterns of demand (Domberger, 1998). An
evolutionary perspective on firm boundaries adds to this that the most significant
impact of vertical dis-integration concerns the influence of firm boundaries on the
dynamic capabilities of the firm - the ability of firms to integrate, build and re-
configure internal and external competencies to address changing contexts (Teece,
Pisano, Shuen, 1998).
There is increasing consensus that firms as institutions are neither exclusively loci
of problem solving, via capabilities or loci of conflict resolution via incentive
structures  – they are both (Foss, 1993; Dosi and Coriat, 1998; Dosi and Marengo,
2000). As Nelson and Winter (1982: 108) argue: “…some sort of stable
accommodation between the requirements of organizational functioning and the
motivation of … organizational members is a necessary concomitants of routine
operation.” Thus incentives and capabilities are interrelated, and both underpin the
dynamic capabilities of the firm. A central question then becomes how increasing
degrees of dis-aggregation change incentives on the one hand, and the ability to
access, maintain and develop capabilities on the other.
First, organizations are often constrained in differentiating their incentives, which
may impede their ability to adapt to changing environments. This is mainly because a
shift to high-powered incentives (Williamson, 1985) could break prior contractual
commitment (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1998), may be regarded as unfair (Pfeffer and
Langton, 1993), or else, is simply incredible (Kreps, 1990; Williamson, 1985). For
example, implicit contracts between divisions and corporate headquarters usually
incorporate a sharing rule to carve up corporate profits (Argyres and Liebeskind,
1999). Would top management decide that an internal venture requires more high-
powered incentives (e.g. stock-options) to spur intrapreneurship, this could violate
prior implicit contracts concerning profit sharing rules among divisions. At other
times, providing high-powered incentives in firms faces limits due to pay comparison
within organizations. Employees may reduce their effort when they perceive pay
differences as inequitable (Pfeffer and Langton, 1993). With these difficulties present,
it is not surprising that undifferentiated incentives are the rule rather than the
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exceptions in firms (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Williamson, 1985). Increasing
degrees of outsourcing can contribute to differentiate incentives because it makes top
management’s commitment to high-powered incentives more credible and social
comparison issues might be relaxed when boundedly rational agents compare
incentives more strongly within the boundaries of their firm rather than across it.
Secondly, Smith (1976) argued that the division of labour enhances skill
development, and by implication, influences the costs of knowledge production. A
greater division of labour increases productivity because the time spent on tasks is
usually more productive to specialized firms that concentrate on a narrow range of
capabilities. Similarly, Prahalad and Hamel, (1994) suggest that corporate dis-
aggregation facilitates specialized learning. Empirical studies associate such work
conditions with the attraction of talent and innovation (Zenger, 1994; Kamien and
Schwartz, 1982). When interaction frequency increases (Demsetz, 1988) in a smaller
subset of relations between actors, cooperation is facilitated (Axelrod, 1984), shared
specialized codes, language, and coordination routines (Cohen and Bacadayan, 1994)
emerge that facilitate knowledge combination (Kogut and Zander, 1992).
While specialized knowledge production has its advantages, an outsourcing firm
has to consider that tapping into specialization gains of others is a complex process
that spans across the outsourcer’s and outsourcee’s activity systems. When it is
possible to dissect capabilities on the outsourcer’s side there is no guarantee that
efficiency gains are realized because the supplier need to re-integrate outsourced
activities. Independently of how an integration of outsourced activities is achieved on
the supplier side, it is well known from the literature on post-merger integration that
such processes come with complications (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991, Jemison and
Sitkin, 1986). Potential synergies (e.g. economies of scale and scope in various parts
of the entire value chain) between new and prior performed activities might be
available on the supplier’s side. But integrating activities may also require substantial
investments in, for example, transition teams, re-arranging knowledge and material
flows, establishing advice networks, and encouraging cooperation (Hamel, 1991;
Levinthal and March, 1993; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Lyles and Stalk, 1996;
Grant, 1996). Moreover, employees that are transferred from one to another company
might react negatively to the new employer, see their career prospects compromised,
or may reject a new working culture. Not in all cases do such integrative problems
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occur, but when they do, associated activities impose process costs of governance
change, which require consideration.
Increasing degrees of outsourcing may also establish a greater dependence for
accessing external knowledge in the form of contingent work (Matusik and Hill,
1998) embedded in specialized supplies (Demsetz, 1988) or, else through inter-firm
learning (e.g. Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). But in a world where costs of knowledge
production including learning and coordinating knowledge stocks are positive, new
opportunities for using resources (Schumpeter, 1952) are easier to discover, know and
act on for some relative to others. While the process of outsourcing can stimulate the
creation of new knowledge by focussing learning in a narrower scope of activities,
vertical dis-aggregation may compromise a firm’s dynamic capabilities by loosing
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) that is crucial for further knowledge
development. If loss of absorptive capacity impedes possibilities to take advantage of
external knowledge sources and increases search costs to find specialised production
partners, vertical dis-aggregation reduces the ability of the firm to access, integrate,
and develop capabilities to address changing competitive environments. Thus, reaping
specialisation gains through focused learning in a focal firm is limited by reduced
absorptive capacity that prevents tapping into and taking advantage of external
knowledge sources of suppliers. When outsourcing reduces absorptive capacity, long-
term adaptability might be compromised, which imposes a long-term opportunity cost
of experimental learning in exploring new competencies as a consequence of
governance change.
On the other hand, if required absorptive capacity is not undermined to an extent
that it impedes accessing and utilising external knowledge, increasing degrees of
outsourcing may contribute to cure the learning trap of over-exploitative learning.
Adaptation of capabilities requires exploitation and exploration of capabilities
(March, 1991; March and Levinthal, 1993). However, while adaptation requires a
balance between both, firms face difficulties to maintain this balance because
successful routines tend to be reinforcing while incentives for selecting new initiatives
are limited in variety. Competence traps (Levinthal and March, 1993) result from
positive feed back between experience and competence. Firms engage in activities
more frequently, in which they are competent, thus, exploiting past learning for
further refinement rather than engaging in risky exploration. One implication of a
competence trap is that costs of experimenting in areas outside current competence
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increases the more remote such experimental learning is from the current competence
base. To the extent that a firm becomes increasingly removed from relevant bases of
experience and knowledge, the more vulnerable to changes in the environment it
becomes (Levinthal and March, 1993; Tushman and Andersen, 1986). In such a
context, increasing degrees of vertical dis-integration can contribute to break
competence traps because firms are exposed to a greater variety of learning
experience at a larger number of organisational interfaces.
To summarize, this section argued that vertical dis-integration can contribute to a
firm’s dynamic capability through focussed learning in the outsourcing firm,
overcoming competence traps, and by limiting the risk of experimentation in the
exploration of new competence. Outsourcing can also sharpen incentives to learn
through re-drawing implicit contracts, relaxing social comparison issues and, by
making credible commitments to high-powered incentives. On the other hand,
outsourcing can have a negative impact on dynamic capabilities by undermining
absorptive capacity, hollowing out current capability endowments, and increasing
search costs in vendor selection.
5.   Conclusions
This paper has argued that an evolutionary process perspective on firm boundaries
with its strong focus on knowledge, as well as processes of search, learning and
capability development is instrumental in developing a theory of firm boundaries that
is close to managerial concerns. Building on insights in evolutionary economics,
refutable propositions have been developed regarding scope, speed, and switching
costs in the process of vertical dis-integration of which outsourcing is a particular
instance. This paper has argued that the scope of vertical dis-integration will be lower
if firms operate in constrained labour markets; in Schumpeter-(II) technological
regimes; with higher degrees of unionisation; and when they are engaged in the
development of systemic innovations. These propositions are not obvious in current
theories addressing firm boundaries. Nonetheless they are of crucial managerial
concern.
Current theories of firm boundaries give indication why certain activities
might be candidates for outsourcing by stressing efficiency gains in terms of
transaction and production costs.  They overlook, however, that ‘technologically
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separable interface’ between activities might be not available in codified form, and
neglect learning dynamics that lead to strategic consequences in terms of capability
development and adaptability in competitive environments of varying dynamics. An
evolutionary perspective on vertical dis-integration suggests that the process of
vertical dis-integration will be slower and more costly, the more capabilities are based
on experience-based knowledge; the less interfaces between activities are specified
ex-ante; the more complex outsourced activities are, and the less participants involved
in the process of governance change are capable and willing to articulate and share
their knowledge with external vendors.  Thus, an evolutionary perspective on vertical
dis-integration recognises that firms make contractual commitments and partly tacit
capabilities develop in a path dependent manner. In addition an evolutionary
perspective contributes to the literature by making explicit switching costs that impact
the scope and speed of the process of vertical dis-integration. Finally, as far as
managers are concerned, the evolutionary perspective on vertical dis-integration
suggests considering long-term consequences of outsourcing processes on the
dynamic capabilities of the firm. A managerial focus on allegedly easy to obtain
short-term efficiency gains obscures the complexity that reflective practitioners have
to deal with when changing the boundaries of the firm.
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